US-China tech rivalry: Where is it headed?
Frequent meetings between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping may extend short-term trade truces, but they are unlikely to resolve the structural technology rivalry.
American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen on November 19; it will be their third meeting of this year. Trump visited Beijing in May, and Xi paid a state visit to Washington in September. A fourth meeting is set for the G20 summit at Trump National Doral in Miami on December 14-15. The leaders of the two great powers have rarely met this often, especially when both the nations are competing to influence and control the global order.
However, these summits are stabilising trade while the technology rivalry is deepening. The trade truce signed between the two nations expires on January 10 next year. There might be some trade agreement, but on the issue of technology, both sides are moving in radically opposite directions.
On the technological side, no event exposes this better than Jensen Huang's downfall in the honeytrap-and-spy scandal. On October 29, the New York Times reported that US officials had concluded that Alice Huang (in Chinese, Huang Le), a Chinese citizen who leads the Singapore-based data-centre firm Megaspeed, was an agent of the Chinese State intelligence agency, the ministry of state security (MSS). Megaspeed has been a customer of NVIDIA and has been accused of helping restricted Chinese companies acquire Nvidia’s AI chips. After Jensen Huang admitted the affair in a memo to staff, Nvidia’s shares fell 4.3%, erasing nearly $200 billion in market value. On November 12, the man who built the world’s most valuable chip company stepped down.
Members of Congress have seized on it to push three bills tightening controls on chips and chipmaking equipment. The most ambitious among them is the MATCH Act, which would give allied toolmakers 150 days to adopt US-style curbs or else face US rules being applied to their exports. Meanwhile, the Commerce Department has already revoked the export exemptions that let Samsung and SK Hynix ship American equipment to their Chinese fabs. Beijing, for its part, had warned against the “abuse of export control measures.”
In this sense, the relationship between the two nations is running on two tracks. On the diplomatic front, both leaders regularly meet and have strong chemistry at the individual leadership level. However, Trump is coming to Shenzhen as a lame duck President after midterm losses have taken hold, and he needs a deal he can sell to farmers and the business community back in the US, which is the social base of Trump's MAGA vote base. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, wants time and tariff relief and holds the stronger hand since he is not going to contest any elections; however, the Chinese Communist Party is heading towards its five-year National Party Congress in the second half of next year. Despite this close relationship between the two leaders, Beijing has kept Washington on a short leash by extending its pause on rare earth export curbs by just two months.
On the technology front, neither side believes the other’s restraint will last. The American trade negotiations have kept chip controls off the table, and China has stopped waiting for American chips. China is now playing a tit-for-tat game in this geopolitical competition. For instance, when Washington approved the export of Nvidia’s H200 chips, Chinese customs officials reportedly told agents the chips were “not permitted” to enter. It shows that Beijing’s priority is no longer access to American technology but independence from it, as it seems.
Trade can be managed through transaction truces, and it can be renewed every few months at the bilateral summits. Technology cannot. The reason is that each side now treats dependence on the other as a strategic vulnerability. The China hawks in Washington see diverted chips feeding the Chinese Military-Civil Fusion or the PLA. It sees the rise of the PLA as a direct threat to American global dominance. China, on the other hand, sees export controls as proof that the ‘core technologies’ cannot be bought, which is the line Xi Jinping often repeats. These bilateral summits at the top level can slow that cycle, but the competition at the technological front is structural in nature and cannot be solved easily.
What are possible scenarios of future rivalry heading now? Neither side is likely to back down, and the spending figures show why. For instance, in 2010, China spent 706 billion yuan ($105.93 billion) on R&D in nominal terms, accounting for 1.6% of its GDP. By 2025, it spent around 3.93 trillion yuan, about $585 billion, or 2.8% of GDP. That put China above the OECD average for the first time. US spending rose from roughly $400 billion in 2010 to an estimated $993 billion in 2024. But on a PPP basis, China has already taken over the US in R&D spending in 2024.
According to OECD indicators, China has officially spent about $1.03 trillion compared to $1.01 trillion for the US. Due to this massive investment, China is closing the research output gap faster than the funding gap. For instance, ASPI’s tracker finds that China produced the most high-impact research in 69 of 74 critical technologies in 2021-25, up from 66 a year earlier, and is at high risk of a monopoly in 41 of them. Basic research remains China’s weak spot: 283 billion yuan, about 7% of its R&D spending, against roughly 15% in the US. These data-driven examinations found that the rivalry between the two great powers has a structural level where they are competing to surpass each other and dominate the world order.
There are three broader scenarios of this competition; the most likely is managed rivalry. In this sense, bilateral and multilateral summits will keep renewing short truces while the two economies separate in chips, AI and defence-linked technology. Another scenario with a rupture, which means a crisis over Taiwan or a collapsed truce, leads Beijing to impose a full rare earth export control regime. China still refines about 85% of the world’s rare earths, and the IEA estimates that full restrictions could put $6.5 trillion of annual production outside China at risk. In retaliation, Washington would answer with sweeping bans on chipmaking tools. The third is a G-2 bargaining, which means Washington trades chip access for rare earths and farm purchases. In this sense, chips, or semiconductors, will determine which scenario prevails. China’s imports of chipmaking tools rose from $10.7 billion in 2016 to $51.1 billion in 2023 as Chinese firms bought ahead of controls being imposed.
Shenzhen and Miami will likely produce a handshake, a few months of an extended truce, and promises on rare earths. They will not produce some structural settlement on technology competition. The rivalry between the two nations will be decided less by what the two leaders sign than by what each country can build.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Rahul Pandey, research associate, China Desk, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.

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